One could be forgiven for thinking that McLaren had just thrown away another victory, such was the reaction of some to the team’s handling of the Hungarian Grand Prix.
McLaren have made some high-profile mistakes this season, most recently at Silverstone two weeks ago, where the decision to stop just one of their cars as the rain began to fall was bad enough – hugely damaging Oscar Piastri’s race – but then choosing not to use the medium tyre they had saved over their rivals during Lando Norris’ final pit stop ended the hopes of both drivers.
It was a race that McLaren arguably should have won and could have potentially finished first or second, but they didn’t have a clear pace advantage that weekend. At different stages of the race, Mercedes or Max Verstappen could claim to have faster cars.
The situation was different at the Hungaroring, where McLaren seemed to have the advantage all weekend and confirmed it by winning from the front row. But as recent races have shown, there is no guarantee of victory.
I asked Andrea Stella on Saturday night if a one-two finish in the race would be the only result he would be happy with, and the McLaren team principal insisted no, because at the very least you can never rule Verstappen out of a race. Plus, track position would be crucial in Budapest, so the other cars can seriously affect your chances.
Fast forward to the start and the moment Piastri took the lead after getting a better launch than his team-mate, and Norris eventually emerged in second after Verstappen handed the position back to him following an off-track overtake.
It was a spot from which McLaren had every chance of converting, and they were not going to let that chance slip away.
Far from criticising the team’s decision in the final round of pit stops, it was Red Bull who made a mistake. Drivers had noted how difficult it was to follow the other cars in the middle sector – lapping in traffic was costing Piastri time – and also how dirty the line was, again due to a moment from Piastri at Turn 11 that halved his lead over Norris.
So there was no risk to be taken in terms of track position and, as the second car on the road, Norris was the one most at risk. Piastri had more room to manoeuvre compared to a non-McLaren car, so he could afford to be brought into the pits as the second of the two cars for the final pit stops.
Attention was focused on the gap to Lewis Hamilton when Norris came out of the pits. The gap was 25.5 seconds at the start of the lap before Norris’ final stop, and at the pace they were lapping at that point, it was expected to be 24 seconds by the line the next time around. Given that you need to be 20 seconds ahead to pit and come out in front, bringing Piastri in first (on the same lap that Norris was brought in) and leaving Norris out for a further lap would have seen his gap to Hamilton become around 22.5 seconds.
That’s what the team was paying attention to, because Hamilton and Leclerc had both pitted too early – at the end of lap 40 – for that final stint. Why? To get ahead of Verstappen, because track position was everything. And even though the Red Bull was a faster car than the Mercedes and Ferrari, there was no guarantee he would be able to overtake them once he caught up.
McLaren’s strategic decisions at the Hungarian Grand Prix were all aimed at ensuring the team had maximum protection from external threats. Andy Hone/Motorsport Images
That scenario is at the heart of Verstappen’s frustration on team radio, as he was passed twice and had to fight his way forward. But he was also one block away from overtaking Hamilton for third and could potentially close in on the McLarens in front.
Verstappen’s pace in the clear air – he had a spell where he was lapping more than half a second quicker than the leaders once released by Hamilton before his final stop – had not gone unnoticed, so McLaren were unwilling to stop too early in response to Hamilton and Leclerc, handing Verstappen the lead for more laps than necessary when a well-timed safety car would have given him a shorter stop.
Similarly, if you stop both McLarens too early, it opens up the possibility for Verstappen to gain a big enough tyre advantage to pose a threat in the event of a later stop.
So the timing of the final stops was a balancing act, and if you stop Piastri first – to avoid an undercut for Norris – you put Norris in more danger against Hamilton and Leclerc who are in second. A stuck wheel and a five-second pit stop instead of the usual two to three seconds and he could lose a position or two.
Norris’s stop was an extremely prudent decision, which ensured a one-two finish for the team. The car most at risk was Norris, as he was second on the road, so by being allowed to stop first, he was effectively giving McLaren priority, when normally the leading car would expect it.
McLaren then dropped Piastri onto the tarmac for an extra lap to balance the threat from the cars behind and allow him to make the most of his tyre life, knowing he would be easily overtaken by Norris. McLaren had full confidence in their driver to respect the call and swap positions at that point, and were simply enjoying the rare luxury of being first and second with two competitive cars at the helm of a race.
Had Norris instantly slowed to let Piastri pass, or done so a few laps into the stint and generally managed his pace better, then none of the increasingly panicked radio messages would have been necessary and the team would probably have received universal praise for their handling of the whole situation.
The only reason such controversy has arisen is Norris’ understandable hesitation when he suddenly had a win in his hands. He had been warned as he entered the pits that this was not to be a coup for Piastri, and he was reminded of this as soon as his team-mate came out behind him. But he argued that he could be allowed to keep the extra points to try and fight for the championship, before eventually giving up his place.
Norris could have handled the situation better, but he also showed the selfishness to think long and hard about his own situation before doing what the team expected of him. McLaren could also have been firmer and clearer in their radio messages around the pit stop and immediately after, rather than just taking a very gentle approach for several laps.
But it is unclear how a team has managed to turn a qualifying one-two into a one-two with two competitive drivers who have had a good relationship and are a key part of McLaren’s growing success. The constructors’ title is a realistic possibility, even if the drivers’ title remains a distant prospect.
The criticism of how McLaren failed to maximise their results in previous races is justified. The loud criticism for ensuring they maximise a race this time around is not, whether it was through annoying radio messages for a few laps or not.